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ABSTRACT: The mention of satellite reconnaissance brings to mind images of large spacecraft, centralized command
centers, and vast rooms of image analysts reading license plates and following political leaders in foreign countries.
This vision of the Cold War shaped a generation of design practices.
With miniaturization, satellites are achieving greater capabilities in smaller packages. The end of the Cold War and an
era of war against terrorism changed reconnaissance targets and objectives. These two factors created opportunities
in space research and development for small companies and academic institutions.
This paper examines 11 paradigms in satellite reconnaissance and how these paradigms are evolving from meeting
strategic needs to tactical needs. The areas are: mission planning, data collection, data preservation, on-board
processing, data transmission, data volume, ground processing, data confidence, order of battle, response time, and
programmatic cost.
The analysis includes business opportunities emerging as a result of this shift, focusing on product opportunities and
business paradigms necessary to establish industry standards for broad market acceptance. It addresses emerging
technologies that must mature to meet current and future needs.
INTRODUCTION

Thus, Strategic Air Command performed the tactical
mission and Tactical Air Command performed the
strategic mission. In January 1992, General Lee Butler
conceived Air Combat Command and Air Mobility
Command.1 Rather than define war doctrine on an
organizational chart, the war-fighting assets were placed
in multi-mission commands. War fighting continues to
evolve with greater inter-service coordination than was
ever before possible.

Entering the first war in Iraq, the United States Air Force
possessed the same organizational structure it had during
the Cold War. Specifically, Tactical Air Command
(TAC) for organizing fighter aircraft into combat
support, Strategic Air Command (SAC) for organizing
bomber aircraft against an enemy’s infrastructure, and
Military Airlift Command (MAC) for moving the Army
to the war.

Reconnaissance spacecraft are now entering the same
type of transition, which is necessary for their continued
relevance. Rather than perform a strategic role of
mapping an enemy nation’s designs and plans, they
are performing a tactical mission of locating targets of
opportunity. To accomplish this new function, their
form must change.

Fortunately, the United States did not follow its
organizational structure in conducting the war. Rather,
it utilized its assets to maximum effectiveness. Instead
of sending the fighter aircraft to the front to battle
the entrenched Iraqi Army, the fighter aircraft flew
into heavily defended areas to surgically bomb key
infrastructure. Rather than pound Iraqi cities into rubble
with SAC’s B-52s, they performed the tactical mission
of bombing the Iraqi front lines.
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One thrust area of the changing role of satellite
reconnaissance is the U.S. Air Force notion of
“responsive space,” laid out by Gen. Lance Lord,
Commander, Air Force Space Command. Responsive
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space and the TacSat programs seek to modularize
small satellites. The concept is that small, modular
satellites can be adapted to rapidly changing needs,
and quickly launched.2 This paper does not address
responsive space. It neither makes a case for or against
responsive space. Rather, it examines the new roles of
space reconnaissance and how those roles do not match
current paradigms.

is here defined as reconnaissance against hostile forces
in a specific theatre of battle. It’s objectives are to locate
and identify mobile hostiles and report them to theater
commanders very rapidly.
Strategic reconnaissance, conceived and created during
the Cold War, clearly came first. Tactical reconnaissance
is only now taking form. Despite their differences,
tactical reconnaissance satellites and their missions are
being designed using the same paradigms found in the
design of strategic reconnaissance satellites.

This paper introduces the notions of strategic space
reconnaissance and tactical space reconnaissance,
borrowing the Air Force terms for SAC and
TAC. Strategic reconnaissance is here defined as
reconnaissance against a nation’s infrastructure,
industrial and military. Its objectives are to characterize
and quantify that infrastructure. Tactical reconnaissance

This paper identifies 11 design areas where paradigms
must shift from strategic to tactical to attain an effective
and economical design of tactical reconnaissance
systems. They are summarized in Table 1 and detailed
afterward.

Table 1. Comparative Design Paradigms for Strategic and Space Reconnaissance
Strategic Space
Reconnaissance

Tactical Space
Reconnaissance

Mission Planning

Objectives are programmed into the
spacecraft, which targets them at the next
opportunity.

Objectives are parameterized, and
targeting is continuous.

Data Collection

Data is collected on-board the spacecraft
and forwarded to ground operators when
they are in view.

Data is collected and transmitted
continuously.

Data Preservation

All data is preserved and guaranteed until
reception is confirmed.

Data is not preserved, its reception is not
guaranteed.

On-Board Processing

Typically only data compression is
performed.

Data is analyzed on-board. Only items of
interest are transmitted.

Data Transmission

Data is transmitted to a single large
ground station.

Data is broadcast to multiple small ground
stations.

Data Volume

Huge; spacecraft transmits all collected
data. Requires high data rate transmission
and bandwidth.

Minimal; spacecraft only transmits data
analysis products. Allows low data rate
transmission.

Ground Processing

The majority of all data processing occurs
on the ground.

Little or no data processing occurs on the
ground.

Confidence

Target identification, performed by
analysts on the ground, has a high degree
of confidence.

Target identification, performed by
spacecraft on-board processing, has a low
degree of confidence and requires target
confirmation by other means.

Order of Battle

Data is forwarded by analysts through the
chain of command to field commanders.

Data is received by field commanders
directly from the spacecraft.

Response Time

Hours to days.

Seconds to minutes.

Cost

Prohibitively expensive.

Affordable opportunities.
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While imaging satellites are often used in the examples
of this paper, the paradigms apply equally to other
satellite missions.

all non-kernel program memory to be wiped and rewritten.
All these capabilities can be demonstrated in small
satellites and they form the underlying architecture
for next generation systems, which can self-determine
whichsoftware configurations are needed and then
perform those alterations without user intervention.

1. Mission Planning
In present-day mission planning, a satellite’s purpose is
defined in painful detail during the requirements phase.
These requirements then drive the spacecraft design. Test
plans are developed, not from the engineering designs,
but rather from the requirements documentation. In the
verification and validation phase, the mantra is, “test
what you launch, and launch what you test.”

2. Data Collection
Traditionally, mission planning drives the data collection
and transmission methodology, which creates the
system requirements, in-turn necessitating the avionics
architecture. Perhaps one of the most predominant
missions plans is, “store and forward”.

Before a spacecraft is launched, its operational plan
schedules the power switching, maneuvers, deployments,
data downlinks, etcetera with accuracy sometimes to the
second. Altering a mission plan is rarely undertaken.
When done, it is usually to mitigate some design flaw.
That process often requires months of engineering
reviews.

In an image collection, mission planners determine the
vehicle’s target and upload corresponding parameters
to the spacecraft for that data collection. When the
spacecraft meets those uploaded parameters, such as time
and angle, it performs the collection. Next, it typically
stores the data in a volatile, solid-state memory. When
the spacecraft has a downlink opportunity of sufficient
duration, the collected data is relayed to the operators
for analysis. The delay between downlink opportunities
and their duration determine the amount of on-board
storage. Memory may be small enough to buffer only
a few collection events, or it may need to store several
days of collection events and be very large. This is a
rudimentary design principle.

This method cannot be tossed out, as it represents
decades of experience developing very complex, yet
reliable spacecraft. Still, the paradigm needs to evolve
and grow. Software engineering is an area where
designers can and have adapted or even defied the design
process to the benefit of the mission.
The Mars Rover, shortly after launch, was
reprogrammed.3 It does not take much imagination
to see this precedent as an alteration of paradigm: the
possibility of significantly altering a satellite’s mission
after launch or of launching a satellite without a mission,
only to define it through a subsequent software upload.
Software is an easy, and perhaps the only, spacecraft
subsystem that can be radically altered after launch.

In the strategic mindset of reconnaissance, store and
forward is appropriate and adequate. Targets are often
physical infrastructure, known signal types, or scheduled
events. A strategic target is one that provides a definable
service in a logical manner and the activity of that
service: a power plant is providing electricity through
a hydro turbine, an armored division provides offensive
capability and is currently inactive. The value of
reconnaissance is determining the capacity of the service
and the method by which it is provided—studying that
object. The store and forward method is appropriate for
studying an object.

There is the additional possibility of a satellite
reconfiguring or reprogramming itself. This has been
discussed in the context of survivability; however, it
is possible for a satellite to detect a change in mission
parameters and reprogram itself accordingly. For
example, an imaging satellite may recognize a transition
from land to water and change its image recognition
algorithms from automobiles to ships.

In contrast, tactical reconnaissance is finding and
quantifying the unknown. Tactical reconnaissance seeks
to quantify and characterize that which is not known
to exist or to locate that which is known to exist in an
active theatre: artillery is being staged to the north and is
protected by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), a scout team is
flanking defenses to the east.

Small satellites have an opportunity in developing
a software architecture that lends itself to robust
reconfiguration. Possibilities include software flowcontrol determined by uploaded constants, software
built though on-board processes interconnected by an
uploaded architecture, and a robust kernel that allows
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The nature of tactical reconnaissance changes the
very architecture of the spacecraft avionics. Rather
than collecting data over a pre-determined location
and storing that data for later retrieval, the tactical
data collection needs to occur continuously and be
immediately transmitted to battle planners underneath
the satellite’s gaze—not transmitted on request, but
transmitted as it is available whether there is an available
receiving station or not.

the data processing center’s workflow capacity, data
from a lower priority collection must be discarded in
favor of data from a higher priority collection. Because
we value economy, we view this as undesirable and size
the collection capacity of our satellites to our ground
capabilities. We design our processing centers with a
number of workstations and keep our workforce relatively
constant as to not disrupt the lives of families dependent
upon the income derived from processing data. Thus,
because we value economy, we unwittingly reduce our
data collection capacity to fit our data processing ability.
This is foolish, as it is easier to increase data processing
than it is to increase data collection.

Thus, the spacecraft trades on-board storage capacity
(with its associated mass, power, and other requirements)
for improved data transmission capacity and, most
certainly, a degree of on-board processing.

The current paradigm: In the design of satellites, we
examine the volume of data a sensor can collect, we
examine the spacecraft orbit in relation to downlink
stations, we examine transmitter and receiver bandwidth
to determine the volume of received data, then we build
a center where data is stored and processed in a business
environment.

3. Data Preservation
As discussed in the previous section, the ‘store and
forward’ mission model requires that collected data be
stored on-board until the spacecraft can downlink it as
it passes over a ground station. Downlink opportunities
are driven by a number of factors.

As tactical reconnaissance grows in demand and as new
capabilities emerge, satellites designs will adapt to the
new requirements. A desire to have a quick turnaround
time from data collection to data reporting may become
a trade with data quality. The ability to determine in
near real-time that something might be over the hill may
override the desire to know exactly what it is 15 minutes
later. Thus, for tactical reconnaissance, requirements
may drive a need for a smaller, more mobile data
processing, even at the cost of data quality—particularly
if that data processing center can be worn on a soldier’s
back. Additionally, if a data processing center can be
made this small and modular, many may enter the theater
and dramatically increase processing capacity.

Tactical reconnaissance typically requires position
knowledge, unlike strategic reconnaissance. Intercepting
a signal, such as voice communications, may satisfy the
strategic mission without a requirement of knowing the
exact position of the signal’s origin. Position knowledge
can be improved by lowering the satellite orbit, which
puts the satellite closer to the target. This has the effect
of reducing the satellite footprint, in turn reducing both
the number of and duration of downlink opportunities.
Unless data is relayed through a communications
satellite, the capabilities of on-board storage must
increase—this is the current paradigm.
By definition, tactical reconnaissance is collected in a
hostile theatre. In war planning, high value infrastructure
such a factories, refineries, and such are not established
in the theatre. Thus, satellite ground stations and data
processing centers are not established in theatre. This
also drives the need for on-board storage—data is not
transmitted and analyzed at its collection point. The size
of the on-board storage increases. Even if data can be
transmitted out of the theatre by means of a relay, it still
must go to a data processing center. Again, this is the
current paradigm.

Changes of this type will drive changes in the spacecraft.
If the data processing center moves into the combat
theatre, so will the downlink station. If miniature
downlink stations begin appearing in mass quantity,
the size of on-board data storage can be reduced until
it no longer exists. Miniaturized downlinks will not
carry the same ocean of raw data typical in strategic
reconnaissance. With raw data, the data volume may be
large, but the information contained in it may be rather
small. With on-board data processing the amount of
information contained in the downlink can be increased,
even though the amount of data is less.

There is also a prevailing mindset that it is nonsensical to
collect data, transmit it, and then discard it without even
a cursory glance at it. Missions are designed to transmit
what they collect. There is no economy in discarding
data; it is wasteful. Nevertheless, this occurs. As data
collection exceeds the satellite’s on-board memory or
Wilkinson

If there are multiple receiving stations in the theatre,
all trying to access the satellite’s data stream, the
satellite will not be able to point a narrow beamwidth
antenna to each station in turn. Rather, the spacecraft
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antenna beamwidth will have to broaden to cover its
whole footprint, and data will have to be encrypted and
broadcast.

performance of the first generation of supercomputers.
With such advances in electronics over decades, why is
current satellite on-board processing underpowered?

This will shape a new paradigm where data is continually
collected, processed as it is collected, and broadcast after
it is collected. Because of the nature of tactical data, if
there is nobody in the theatre to receive the data, then it
is not needed. Rather than retrieving a high percentage
of collected data and ensuring its reception, as is the case
with strategic reconnaissance, only a small percentage of
collected tactical data may be needed and its reception
does not necessarily need to be ensured.

Arguably, supercomputers exist which can now be
flown on spacecraft and survive the rigors of space.
Unfortunately, space-based processors lag a generation
or two behind commercial processors because of
radiation issues. Fortunately COTS processors can
function in space and are used, particularly for nonmission critical processes. On-board processing of
payload data is certainly a candidate area for COTS
processors, especially considering advances in fault
detection. Fault detection and recovery make COTS
processors as robust as radiation-hardened processors
for mitigating single-event upsets. Unfortunately, COTS
processors are still very limited in lifespan because of
total radiation dose susceptibility.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) polar-orbiting environmental satellites (POES,
individually known as TIROS and NOAA) continually
collect weather data. The advanced very high resolution
radiometer (AVHRR) instrument data is broadcast by
the automatic picture transmission (APT) system.4 Any
ground station below the satellite can receive the data
being collected by the satellite in near real-time.

As the U.S. Air Force looks toward the future with the
TacSat programs, they discuss a future where satellites
are held ready for launch so that payloads and orbit
parameters may be tailored to a particular theatre. A
longer lifespan is not a principal requirement of TacSats,
putting shorter lifespan in the trade-space for mission
capabilities. While space-rated supercomputers will
be developed, supercomputers are already feasible for
operational missions and long past being mature for
technology demonstration.

As small satellites often operate on very limited budgets,
their downlink opportunities are often far more limited
than desired. Their methods of coping with such
limitations are the model the tactical reconnaissance
spacecraft will need.
4. On-Board Processing

Supercomputers in space make feasible the other topics
discussed in this paper: Greater spacecraft autonomy
changes the nature of mission planning. It improves
the ratio of data collected to data transmitted, and it
improves the quantity of information in transmitted
data. These in turn reduce the data volume required
to obtain useful information, which, in turn, reduces
communications link demand.

On-board processing is the focal point of the changing
paradigm. In America’s first spy satellite program,
Corona, image-bearing film was dropped from orbit and
recovered. The film was then processed, and analyzed.5
In the present day, images are collected by chargedcoupled devices (CCD) and other technologies, then
transmitted via radio frequency links, where the data is
assembled back into images.
The paradigm of taking the film to the darkroom became
the paradigm of storing large data quantities on massive
supercomputers, as the definition of supercomputer
changed every year. In December 1999, Apple Computer,
Inc had to petition the U.S. Government to lift an export
ban on the PowerMac G4 professional desktop system.
Its performance exceeded limits permitted under federal
export restrictions.6

Thus, on-board processing will drive the paradigm
shift of tactical reconnaissance spacecraft operations
and design. Rather than collecting and transmitting
entire images, on-board processing will enable satellites
to search the data for items of interest and transmit
only small regions of the total image. Civil Air Patrol
(the USAF Auxiliary) is already doing this with their
ARCHER hyperspectral imaging systems mounted in
their 8-passenger, single engine Gippsland Airvans.

Supercomputer improvements are classically used
for performance gains, but they can also be used to
introduce capabilities where they did not exist before.
Case in point, mobile phones do not have the same level
of capabilities of laptop computers, but they exceed the

The Nanyang Technological University in Singapore
developed a Beowulf cluster to perform on-board
processing on the X-Sat, for the purpose of eliminating
images of limited value to reduce transmission
bandwidth requirements.7
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Advanced on-board data processing may even enable
future satellites to recognize objects and transmit
identification and coordinates without any image
transmission. This level of capability is likely a decade
or more into the future.

discern their design and performance. From this, they
develop strategic and tactical plans to counter the
threat. In the tactical theatre, the time for studying your
opponent and developing plans is past. “I would rather
have a good plan today than a perfect plan two weeks
from now,” said General George S. Patton.

5. Data Transmission
Processing reduces the large quantity of collected data
and extracts information from the data. In a tactical
theatre, commanders already have a map of their theatre.
They do not need a photograph of it. Similarly, they do
not need photographs of Russian T-72 tanks and MiG-21
aircraft. They know what these look like. What they
need is the location of these objects on their maps. This
is the paradigm of tactical reconnaissance—the images
can, in an ideal world, be eliminated.

To distill the requirements of tactical reconnaissance
to the most basic form, it is to create a real-time eye in
the sky. To meet this requirement, data should not be
transmitted out of the theatre for processing. Rather it
should be transmitted from the space platform to the
operational units in-theatre and processed by them.
When this ideal is achieved, central command will no
longer collect tactical reconnaissance data. Rather,
they will receive their situational awareness from the
operational units, who process the tactical reconnaissance
data and fuse it with other data available to them. This
creates a better report of a theatre’s situation than
can be obtained by performing the same data fusion
out of theatre at a central command post. When this
technology is realized, the theatre command will have
better data, and the regional war planners, receiving
situational flow-down from the theatre, will have a more
complete picture of the war effort. If fully achieved, data
will be disseminated and command decisions made at a
more appropriate organizational level.

Not only can photographs be reduced to identities and
coordinates, but it can be further reduced to nature and
coordinates. If a commander knows the location of a
tank, he very likely does not need to know whether it
is a Russian T-72 or an American M1 Abrams. He very
likely knows where his tanks are located. It can be even
further distilled.
If an analyst, a hemisphere away, were told there was an
object having the spectral signature of metal sitting in the
middle of a desert, more information would be needed.
A commander cognizant of his theatre and given the
same information may know if the data is ordinary and
irrelevant, or unusual and potentially significant. Thus
an image, being millions of bytes in size, may be reduced
to a coordinate and spectral identifier only a dozen bytes
in length, and still have significant information.

One method of achieving this is a change to the methods
of data transmission. Satellite data must be compact
enough to meet the link budget requirements imposed by
limited reception. It becomes unreasonable to expect the
principal data user will have the capacity to input tasking
orders to the reconnaissance asset. Thus, the satellite
must be always collecting data, always transmitting
without flow control (broadcasting), and it must be
determining what subset of the collected data is of the
greatest value to the user.

Thus the paradigm of tactical reconnaissance is that
data can be reduced to a volume which can be broadcast
by a satellite, received by a hand-held device, and still
provide meaningful information.
7. Data Processing

Again, on-board processing becomes the greatest
technological need, to reduce raw data into information.
However, there are others as well. Broadcasting data
in the theatre requires a wide beamwidth antenna,
strong encryption, robust EDAC (error detection and
correction), and high-quality compression. It also betrays
the location of the reconnaissance asset subjecting it to
attack and its signal to jamming.

Extracting information from data requires data processing
and data analysis. The principal difference between the
two is that computers do processing and human experts
do analysis. Some of the processing can be automated,
but an expert must perform the final step.
This is principally where the notions of strategic
reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance diverge.
Data is similarly normalized and improved by automated
processes, but the information extracted out of the data
will differ between strategic and tactical settings.

6. Data Volume
Strategic reconnaissance needs photographs of tanks,
planes, and such operating in their environment to
Wilkinson

6

20th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

Strategic information seeks to understand the capabilities
and intent of an enemy force by closely studying their
material manifestations and their actions. In the tactical
setting, there is little time for studying the opponent.
The best information is the opponent’s location, thus the
required data fidelity is much reduced.

reduced bandwidth. This changes the entire engineering
design of the spacecraft and better matches the
requirements of tactical reconnaissance.
9. Reconnaissance Order of Battle
In strategic reconnaissance, the target of the
reconnaissance is known or suspected well in advance
of the data collection. An objective is identified, the
collection is performed, the data is transmitted to
analysts, and then the collected information is acted
upon. This architecture evolved to meet requirements
but was also limited by technology constraints. Strategic
satellites were conceived before the technology existed
to create them, and technology was invented to meet
their requirements.

With reduced fidelity, automated data processing
requires less computational power and less bandwidth
to transmit the results. It becomes feasible to move data
processing from complex computation centers and into
the spacecraft itself. This heavily processed and reduced
data may then be transmitted to an in-field soldier who is
cross-trained in combat as well as tactical data analysis.
Combat and tactical data analysis is an appropriate
combination. Strategic data analysis requires a formal
education and does not blend as well with combat
training.

Tactical reconnaissance will require different technology
that is only now emerging. It will require different types
of sensors. It will require processors with far more
power than are currently being used in space. It will
require a different communications infrastructure: one
that has fewer nodes but more complex components.

In tactical reconnaissance, the sensor fidelity may
have more stringent requirements than a sensor for a
strategic mission, for example to detect people rather
than structures, but the automated data processing
algorithms do not need to extract a significant amount
of information. Typically, an object (or even just an
anomalous cluster of pixels) will only need to be located
and not necessarily identified.

In tactical reconnaissance, objectives will not be
uploaded in the form of time and slew angle. They will
be spectral or geometric parameters independent of time
and location. Data collection will occur continuously,
not on command. Collected data will not be transmitted;
rather, data will be processed into information. The
processed information will be transmitted, not the raw
data. Instead of transmitting data to a secure location for
relay down a chain-of-command, the transmission can
be encrypted and broadcast immediately to the theatre
that was reconnoitered.

8. Data Confidence
Strategic reconnaissance often influences national
policy. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and nuclear programs in North Korea
and Iran are perfect examples. Strategic reconnaissance
must have the highest degree of confidence.
On the other hand, tactical reconnaissance does not need
as high a level of confidence. Strategic reconnaissance,
by its very nature collects data of denied areas. Tactical
reconnaissance, on the other hand, is collected in the
area immediately surrounding the data user. Being in
the area, the user has additional resources to verify lowconfidence data. Also, the field commander will have
greater familiarity of an area than a remote analyst and
be able to infer more information from the data.

This changes the order of battle for reconnaissance
units. Order of battle is the organizational structure of a
nation’s military units. Rather than being national assets
that flow-down their war-fighting products to the unit
level, they become assets to many units simultaneously.
Such a concept cannot be captured by a classic order of
battle, and it is a significant departure from the role of
strategic reconnaissance satellites.
10. Response Time

In developing requirements for tactical reconnaissance
missions, mission planners must realize the paradigm of
high data confidence is not relevant and is an artifact of
strategic reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance can
tolerate much lower degrees of data confidence. This
reduces the complexity and makes possible on-board
processing which can generate useable information.
It also simplifies data transmission, which has muchWilkinson

The military is undoubtedly struggling to develop
technologies which will shorten the delays between data
collection and information delivery to field commanders.
This is good and should continue. However, these efforts
are, in primal essence, an attempt to extract tactical
reconnaissance from a strategic infrastructure.
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In order to reach the goal of delivering tactical
information to field commanders, tactical data needs
to be collected and delivered in a tactical infrastructure.
Recognizing these as requirements will naturally create
a paradigm shift and will result in greater long-term
success.

control as strategic assets, and the controlling entity
needs to understand the defined roles and capabilities
of each to become a multi-mission force, as was the
objective in merging Strategic Air Command and
Tactical Air Command into a singular Air Combat
Command.

While orbital mechanics will always delay the collection
asset to the target, and there is little we can do about
this other than increase the numbers of satellites, we can
work the problems occurring after the collection asset
arrives at the target.

In an industry that began by dropping film canisters
from orbit, it was difficult to imagine a satellite capable
of analyzing it own raw data and reporting specific
contacts. This paper attempts to visualize the future as
the entire nature of the satellite reconnaissance industry
changes. Realize this is a significant change, and
imagine the future. Our imagination needs to change
before our satellites will.

Without these paradigm shifts, we can strive for
responsiveness measured in minutes. With these
paradigm shifts, we can strive for responsiveness
measured in seconds.
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CONCLUSION
The nature of warfare necessarily changes the context
in which we place reconnaissance data. Reconnaissance
technology was conceived and developed for the
express purpose of waging a cold war. While tactical
reconnaissance is suited to a shooting war, it is not for
this express purpose it should be designed. The greater
threat to nations in this century is the subversion of
governments by ideological extremists and the conquest
of human resolve through fear. It is a hybrid of a cold
war and a shooting war.
While strategic reconnaissance is more suited to fighting
ideological wars, tactical reconnaissance is also required.
Tactical reconnaissance assets need to be designed to
fight both shooting wars and ideological wars. Clearly,
neither strategic nor tactical reconnaissance is the clear
choice for this century. Fighting an ideological war
requires a fusion of strategic and tactical reconnaissance.
These future tactical assets need to be under the same
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